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Abstract
This paper empirically examines developments in price and ination in China
from 1991 to 2005. Unlike most previous studies, their determinants were inves-
tigated in the panel data context, and our ndings are as follows. First, using
the panel cointegration method, we conrm a long-run relationship between
price, money and output. Secondly, we provide evidence that ination can be
explained by economic fundamentals such as money, credits, productivity, and
exchange rate growth. Furthermore, while an increased concern about regional
discrepancies in recent years, this relationship is more sensitive to the sample
period than to the region type. Notably, money does not seem to be closely
associated with ination over recent years.
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1 Introduction
Over recent years, China has experienced high economic growth with relatively mod-
erate ination by international standards. Its annual GDP growth rate has often
exceeded 10 percent with a peak of around 35 percent in the mid 1990s. Because
many developed countries have experienced slow economic growth since 1990, China
has often been claimed as the engine of the world economy.
Figure 1 shows the Chinese GDP growth (measured in local currency), Chinese
ination, and world average ination rates from 1991 to 2005. This suggests that the
Chinese ination rate was generally lower than its GDP growth and the world ination
rate, and actually experienced deation in the second half of the 1990s and early
2000s. The low ination relative to GDP is consistent with Chinas macroeconomic
policy since the ve-year economic plan often makes reference to this as one of its
economic targets. The moderate ination rate was argued as resulting from several
factors including a strong supply side owing to the cheap labor force and periodic weak
demand for consumer goods.1
However, in the last couple of years, the sustainability of this economic growth
has been brought into question since cheap labor is no longer available, and there is
considerable upward pressure on wages and ination. More recently, considerable con-
struction for the 2008 Beijing Olympics as well as soaring commodity (e.g., wheat and
oil) prices worldwide have become additional factors contributing to the increased in-
ationary pressure. While the adverse e¤ects of the sub-prime loan crisis have became
apparent worldwide in the second half of 2008 and subdued inationary pressure, it
began to increase again in China in 2009 along with world economic recovery.
Ination increases in China have major policy implications for both domestic and
international economies. Amongst other possibilities, high ination may have a dele-
terious e¤ect on future Chinese economic growth, resulting in higher wages, more
expensive exports, and fewer foreign reserves. Moreover, due to the high volume of
exported goods, more expensive exports from China might increase ination overseas
also. Thus, it has become a pressing research topic in many countries.
Among many others, pertinent previous studies include Huang (1994), Girardin
(1996), Chen (1997), Hasan (1999), Gerlach and Peng (2006), Funke (2006), and
Burdekin and Siklos (2006). Using country-level data, Huang (1994) and Chen (1997)
conrmed a long-run relationship in the standard money demand function, and Hasan
(1999) reports a close relationship between price and money supply, and between
ination and monetary growth. In contrast, Girardin (1996) raises evidence against
cointegration in the money (currency) demand function. Mehrotra et al (2007) is one
of a few examples of analyzing regional ination in China, but focuses on inationary
1Yusuf (1994) summarizes Chinese economic developments and policy from 1973 to 1993.
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developments and did not analyze price levels, i.e., the long-run implications of price
movements.2
Finally, adjusting our focus to a more global context, evidence is reported of how
cheap Chinese exports (i.e., low ination) helped achieve lower ination in many im-
porting countries during 1994 to 2003 (Koyuncu and Yilmaz 2006) but of their limited
e¤ect on Japan and the US (Feyzioglu and Willard 2008).
Against this background, this paper empirically investigates the dynamics of Chi-
nese price and ination using regional data. Due to data availability, we focus mainly
on the credits and exchange rate channels of the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy.3 Use of regional data sets this study apart from previous studies based on
country-level data, and is motivated by the fact that ination rates, or more generally
economic developments, are not uniform across the regions in China.4 Furthermore, a
panel data analysis allows us to check the sensitivity of our results obtained from full
sample observations to the sample period and regional groups, which was impossible
in time series analysis due to the limited time span available for study and thus was
not addressed in previous studies. Finally, while previous panel data studies focused
on inationary developments, this paper explores the long-run implications of prices
as well. In the presence of a long-run relationship (i.e., cointegration) in the price
equation, incorporating information of the transition to a steady-state will enrich the
analysis.
In order to achieve this, this paper comprises four sections. Section 2 summarizes
the history of recent monetary policy in China. This helps us choose pertinent explana-
tory variables and interpret the empirical results. Section 3 discusses the economic
factors chosen here to explain the inationary episodes, and presents the empirical
results. This section also investigates the long-run price behavior using the advanced
panel cointegration test (e.g., Westerlund 2007). The paper concludes with Section 4.
Among many other results, we provide evidence of ination being explained by eco-
nomic fundamentals such as money, credits, productivity, and exchange rate growth.
However, we show that their relationship with ination appears to be sensitive to the
sample period. Indeed, while policymakersincreasing concerns about regional dispar-
ities (Nagayasu and Liu 2008), this relationship is more sensitive to the time period
than region type.
2In addition, Guillaumont Jeanneney and Hu (2002) examine Chinese relative prices (i.e., the ratio
of the price in one province to another, (Pit=Pjt) where P is price and province i 6= j). Our study is
di¤erent from theirs since our focus is on regional ination (Pit=Pit 1)
3As will be explained in Section 2, interest rate movements were restricted until very recently.
4Xu (2002) shows that region-specic factors account for one third of the variation in Chinese
output growth. Sakamoto and Islam (2008) show that some provinces are catching up with the
higher income group during the reform period (1978-2003) but an overall provincial convergence is
open to question.
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2 A Brief History of Chinese Monetary Policy5
The Peoples Bank of China (PBC), the central bank, was established in December
1948 after the consolidation of the Huabei, Beihani and Xibei Farmer Banks. But it
was only in September 1983 that the PBC was invested with central bank functions.
At present, monetary policy is conducted under the Law of the Peoples Bank of China,
which became e¤ective in 1995 and stipulates that [t]he objective of monetary policy
is to maintain the stability of the value of the currency and thereby promote economic
growth(http://pbc.gov.cn/english/huobizhengce/objective.asp). Thus, the PBC has
a mandate to stabilize prices today.6
Prior to the establishment of this Law, the monetary policy of the PBC had dual
objectives. First, the PBC allocated nancial resources at the micro level in an e¤ort
to stimulate economic growth based on the economic development plans, and secondly,
it attempted to stabilize prices. While these objectives are not mutually exclusive, the
PBC in practice seemed to be biased toward conducting monetary policy to promote
economic growth and development (Montes-Negret 1995, Xie 2001).
Furthermore, while money (M1 and M2) has remained as an intermediate target
of monetary policy, the PBCs instruments have also changed over time due partly to
developments in the nancial institutions and markets in China. The PBC frequently
employed a credit policy for commercial banks, which had socio-economic implications
and resulted in a tendency to lend to the large state-owned enterprises that account
for a large number of employees (Goodfriend and Prasad 2007). Under this policy,
money in the market was expected to be controlled directly by inuencing the lending
operations of commercial banks.
Apparently, this credit policy was e¤ective in terms of controlling ination (see
Figure 1). The hike in ination in the early 1990s was argued as resulting from
the boom in the construction industry, high investment in the car industry, and the
liberalization of lending policies to state owned enterprises (SOE).7 High ination was
curbed by the PBC ordering commercial banks to freeze lending.
From 1998, the PBC started using a more market-oriented approach under the ini-
tiative of Zhu Rongji because of the increasing problems arising in Chinas transitional
economy, e.g., price distortion and conicting policy objectives. In this approach, the
PBCs instruments include the reserve requirement ratio, central bank base interest
rate, rediscounting, central bank lending and open market operations. More recently,
5We focus mainly on economic developments in China in this section from 1991-2005 which is the
sample period of our investigation.
6With respect to its independence, which is often discussed as negatively associated with ination
(Alesina and Summers 1993), the PBC is not independent in the sense that it remains institutionally
part of the State Council (government).
7The framework for interest rate liberalization was initially laid out in November 1993 (Laurens
and Marino 2007).
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PBC bills were introduced from September 2002. Similarly, the discount rate (oating
rate central bank discount lending) was initiated in 2004, and the reserve requirement
was more intensively used. Furthermore, in 2005, the reverse bond based repo was
introduced to cope with foreign exchange inows resulting from the trade surplus.
However, despite such recent developments, Green (2005) discusses that this market-
oriented approach has only had limited e¤ectiveness in stimulating the economy due
to the slow progress in nancial market reform in China.8 As a result, credit policy
remains an important instrument for the PBC even today.
Monetary policy is also closely related to the exchange rate regime since exchange
rate devaluation (depreciation) tends to increase domestic prices. According to the
de facto exchange rate arrangements and anchors of monetary policypublished by
the IMF (July 31, 2006)9, the Chinese exchange rate regime is classied as an other
conventional xed peg arrangement, and a monetary aggregate target is the monetary
policy framework.10 As shown in Figure 2, before 1994, the Renminbi (RMB) was
determined by a basket of internationally traded currencies and exhibited substantial
movement against the US dollar.11 But the RMB has become very stable against the
US dollar since 1994 due to its exchange rate being, in practice, more or less xed
against the US dollar as part of the exchange rate policy. Notably its revaluation
(July 21, 2005) from RMB8.28/US$ to RMB8.11/US$ has generally been welcomed as
part of Chinas e¤orts to reduce its trade surplus although the exibility of the RMB
is still very limited.12
In order to maintain the nominal value of the currency and avoid high ination,
the Chinese authorities carried out foreign exchange interventions, and attempted to
sterilize their e¤ects through open market operations (i.e., sales to the public of gov-
ernment bonds).13 However, this policy was not su¢ cient to sterilize them; aggregate
money has increased, and in practice the RMB has been undervalued, leading to a large
Chinese current account surplus, in particular against the US (e.g., Corden 2007).14
8See Feyzioglu, Porter and Takats (2009) about interest rate liberalization in China.
9See the IMF homepage (http://www.imf.org).
10The Chinese currency, the Renminbi, was rst issued in 1949. But it was only during the late
1980s and early 1990s, that it became convertible for current account transactions.
11In conventional economic theory, monetary authorities lose one policy instrument for economic
stabilization under the xed rate regime. In the past, some high ination countries pegged their
exchange rate against countries with low ination in order to reduce their domestic ination rate by
importing the credibility of the partners central bank. However, this argument may not be valid in
China which is a huge country in terms of geographical area, population, and economy although per
capita income may be very low.
12For example, RMB/US$ is allowed to move within 0.3 percent around the central parity pub-
lished by the PBC. Since 2005, the RMB has begun to rise but is again more or less xed against the
US dollar since July 2008.
13Green (2005) estimates that the authorities sterilized about 47 percent of capital inows in 2004.
14Since the gradual transition from a command- to market-oriented economy was pronounced in
1989 when Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) became the General Secretary of the Community Party, the
introduction of the market oriented approach has been included as a key agenda item in the com-
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data Description
Our data set covers the period of 1991 to 2005 (annual data) and 27 regions; Bei-
jing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujina, Jiangxi, Shangdong, Henan, Guangdong, Guangxi,
Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.
The sample period and regions are determined solely by data availability at the time
of conducting this research. Table 1 classies the regions into high- and low-growth
groups in terms of real GDP growth. In order to carry out empirical research later, a
similar number of provinces are allocated to each of these two groups.
Furthermore, based on previous studies and data availability, we consider the fol-
lowing variables for our analysis of Chinese ination. The reasons for choosing them
and their expected relationship with ination are summarized briey below. Note
that since this paper is applied research in nature, our explanation is limited to a
minimum.15
Price and Ination: Due to the lack of a Consumer Price Index (CPI), our
regional ination is based on Retail Price Index (RPI) data obtained from the World
Bank Database. The similarity between average CPI and RPI is shown in Figure 3.
Log ination is calculated using the RPI.
Money (M1 & M2): Narrow money (M1) is by denition part of broad money
(M2) which here is the total of narrow money and quasi money. Classical economic
theory (e.g., the quantity theory) argues that there is a positive correlation between
money and prices, indicating that a decrease in money should bring about price re-
duction (i.e., less ination). Furthermore, narrow money is argued as easier controlled
by monetary authorities compared with broad money. The data are obtained from the
IMFs International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Credits: As reviewed in the previous section, the Chinese monetary authorities
attempted to inuence market liquidity by means of administrative controls. A decline
in credits indicates reduced lending to economic organizations and thus this credit
policy should help curb ination. These data are also from the IFS.16
prehensive 5 year economic plans. This policy continues under the Hu Jintao administration (since
2002).
15One could also consider using other scale variables such as the output gap, and expected and
lagged ination in order to evaluate ination in a Keynesian-type model. But given our short historical
data and data availability, they are not used in this study.
16Empirical results which will be shown later are based on an ination equation comprising both
money and credits. The general results remain unchanged even though money and credits enter
separately in the equation. Furthermore, while there exist credit data at the provincial level, they
seem to be limited only to 1992 to 1998 (see Guillaumont Jeanneney and Hua 2002). Due to the
available sample size, we opted not to use the regional level data.
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Productivity: Generally, it is believed that there is a negative relationship be-
tween ination and productivity since improved productivity may bring about less
expensive goods and lower ination. Most previous studies seem to report the neg-
ative relationship (e.g., De Gregorio 1992, Christopoulos and Tsionas 2005). In this
study, productivity is measured by real GDP per employee and is calculated for each
region. The provincial GDP data are obtained from the World Bank Database, and
employment gures from the National Bureau of Statistics of China and the Chinese
Statistical Yearbook.
Population growth: The relationship between ination and population growth
may not be clear at least from theoretical point of view. Population growth often
results in higher demand for products. If the supply side remains unchanged, we
would expect higher ination. Thus, a positive relationship would be expected be-
tween population growth and prices (ination). In contrast, when the supply-side
e¤ect of population growth is stronger, this variable may be negatively correlated with
ination. Population data between 1995 and 2005 are obtained from the National Bu-
reau of Statistics of China, and those prior to 1995 are from the Chinese Population
Yearbook.17
Exchange rates: This is considered here as one determinant of Chinese ination
although the bilateral exchange rate vis-á-vis the US dollar is more or less xed after
1994 (Figure 2). Consideration of this variable is due to the visible exchange rate
uctuations prior to 1994 and also the close relationship of the exchange rate with
the price level before 1994 (Figures 1 and 2). Here the exchange rate is the RMB
against the US dollar and is obtained from the IFS. One may argue for using the
e¤ective exchange rate, but the bilateral rate is employed here since these two types of
rates are highly correlated with one other (e.g., the correlation coe¢ cient equals 0.9).
Furthermore, recently the bilateral rate has more policy implications due to the rise
in Chinese trade surpluses against the US.
In short, unlike previous studies, we use both region- and country-level data when
analyzing developments in regional ination. General inationary trends common to
regions would be expected to be described by country-level data, and region-specic
movements by regional data.18 Furthermore, these data are examined using the instru-
mental variable estimation method in order to take account of the possible endogeneity
problem in Section 3.4. Instrumental variables will be listed in the relevant tables and
are obtained from the IMFs World Economic Outlook database.
17While population growth is not necessarily equivalent to labor growth, in China there is a ten-
dency of migration from poorer western areas to the richer coastal areas in order to seek employment
or a better working environment. Fan (2002) conrms that there is a signicant demographic di¤er-
ence between the eastern and western regions, which partly reects this migration.
18Here, data availability determines the role of explaining general or specic ination movements.
The inclusion of the time dummy does not alter our general conclusion.
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3.2 Preliminary Analysis
The ination (price) equations are estimated using the abovementioned determinants
and several statistical methods, and the results are summarized in Tables 2 to 5. One
general conclusion is that ination can be explained by economic fundamentals such
as money, credits, productivity, and exchange rate growth.
We start the preliminary analysis by estimating the following equation.
Pit = 0+1Moneyt+2Creditst+3Prodit+4Popit+5RMBt+uit (1)
In the above equation, Moneyt refers to either broad money or narrow money.
Credits and the exchange rate are denoted as Credits and RMBt respectively. Pro-
ductivity and population growth are shown as Prodit and Popit. The residual is
indicated as uit. All data are in log form, and  is the di¤erence operator. Subscript
i (i =1,. . . ,27) represents region and t (t =1991,. . . ,2005) is time, and the s are pa-
rameters to be estimated. Consideration of both money and credit in the monetary
transmission process is pointed out for example by Brunner and Heltzer (1988) and
Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Previous research (see Section 1) often showed that
these variables are nonstationary, and therefore a di¤erenced equation should be more
appropriate.
Table 2 shows the empirical results from the standard panel data estimation meth-
ods (i.e., the xed and random e¤ects models). The results from the di¤erent methods
nevertheless share many similarities. Consistent with economic theory, money and
credits are positively and signicantly related with ination. Given the fact that M1
and M2 have been used as intermediate targets of monetary policy and credits as
instruments, this raises evidence that the Chinese monetary authorities have indeed
been inuencing ination. Furthermore, this table shows clear evidence of productiv-
ity being negatively associated with ination; improved productivity helped suppress
ination movements. In addition, the exchange rate is found to be positively and sig-
nicantly correlated with Chinese ination, indicating that RMB appreciation tends
to lead to lower ination. This nding seems to be in conformity with previous studies
(e.g., Liu and Tsang 2008)19 and the PBCs concern that ination may be triggered
by an increase in RMB. Finally, while their parameter signs are consistent with our
expectations, population growth is statistically insignicant.
We implement the Hausman test in order to investigate which analytical model is
statistically more appropriate. Although empirical results are very similar regardless
of estimation method, the test result suggests that the random e¤ects model is more
19Liu and Tsang (2008) discuss that RMB appreciation is one way to suppress inationary pressure
in China arising from an increase in global commodity prices.
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suited for describing ination movements in China.
3.3 Long-Run Analysis
While our research focus was on ination in the previous subsection, existing studies
often identied the presence of a long-run relationship between price and economic
fundamentals using the money demand function and country-level data (see Section
1). In the presence of cointegration in our data, the ination model such as equa-
tion (1) is misspecied since we could incorporate the disequilibrium condition in the
money market measured by the so-called error correction mechanism (ECM). One
distinguishing feature of our study is that the ECM is estimated in the panel data
context.20
Our long-run analysis is based on the following general equation.
Pit = Moneyt + Yit + eit (2)
where Moneyt is either broad or narrow money. The constant is dropped for
simplicity in equation (2) but is included in the estimation. The Yit represents real
output deated by regional RPI (Pit). The residual eit is equivalent to the ECM and
is dened as Pit   P^it where P^it is an estimate of Pit. All variables are in log form.
Thus, equation (2) is analogous to the quantity theory of money.
This price equation estimated by the OLS is reported in Table 3. It shows that
Moneyt is positively correlated with prices while Yit is negatively correlated. These
parameter signs are in line with standard economic theory, and we can observe that
money is much more inuential over prices given the relative insensitivity of Yit to
prices.
We have also checked the presence of a long-run relationship in equation (2) using
panel cointegration tests (Kao 1999, Pedroni 1999, Westerlund 2007). Cointegration
tests allow short-term deviation from the steady-state and thus are viewed as well-
suited for long-run analysis. The presence of cointegration in (2) suggests a common
trend and a long-run linear relationship between price, money, and output. Classical
studies (Kao 1999, Pedroni 1999) proposed a two-step residual-based cointegration
method. The rst step is to estimate equation (2) to obtain eit while the second step
involves analysis of this residual using for example equation (3).
eit = eit 1 + eit 1 + uit (3)
20Interest rates are not included here since, as discussed previously, they have been highly regulated
and have not yet performed adequately as an instrument of monetary policy. Furthermore, the
Westerlund (2007) method does not allow us to include another variable due to our short sample
period.
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where eit 1 is introduced to control for autocorrelation but (3) can be of higher
order like the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. The null hypothesis of no cointe-
gration can be tested by examining  = 1, and a rejection of this hypothesis indicates
the presence of cointegration.21
Furthermore, recently Westerlund (2007) proposes two types of tests, of which we
use one, what he calls the panel statistic.22 This test is especially suitable for our
research since it exploits the cross-sectional information of the panel and p-values to
analyze the null and is based on the bootstrap method in order to circumvent the
cross-sectional dependence problem which likely exists in our data. In short, this test
is based on the following specication.
pit = id+ i(pit 1   0ixit 1) +
qiX
j=1
ijpit j +
qiX
j=0
ijxit j + #it (4)
where x is the explanatory variables of the price and # is the residual. The max-
imum lag length of one is used for qi.The presence of the error correction term (or
cointegration) can be tested by the null hypothesis of i = 0 for all i against the
alternative of i =  < 0. A rejection of the null hypothesis provides evidence of
cointegration for the panel as a whole.
The results from these panel tests are also reported in Table 3, and suggest coin-
tegration between price, money and output. This nding is consistent with previous
studies using country-level price data (e.g., Huang 1994, Chen 1997).23 Furthermore,
this result is of particular interest since price stabilization was not the sole objective
of the monetary authorities in years past and about 24 percent of prices are regulated
through price controls (Laurens and Maino 2007).
3.4 Further Analysis
Using the ECM (pit 1   0ixit 1 ) obtained in the previous section, we will extend
equation (1) and estimate the ination specication using the instrumental variables
(IV) since our reduced form equation may su¤er from endogeneity bias. For example,
this bias may arise in the ination-productivity relationship. Higher ination may
increase the tax burden on the private sector in the non-neutral tax structure (Jarrett
and Selody 1982), and reduces the optimal contract and planning period which results
21The null hypothesis becomes  = i in the Pedroni test.
22Only the panel statistic is used here because the other test does not utilize the cross sectional
information of the data and its alternative hypothesis is di¤erent from the panel statistic and becomes
i < 0.
23One needs to be careful about interpreting our results since the sample period is limited. However,
given that there is a bias in favor of no cointegration when the sample period is short (Gutierrez 2003),
our result of rejecting the null hypothesis at one percent signicance in most cases seems to support
our conclusion.
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in a rise in contracting costs (Hayes and Abernathy 1980). In both cases, rms will
confront additional costs which hinder productivity growth.24
Thus we consider now the following extended ination equation.
pit = 0+1Moneyt+2Creditst+3Prodit+4RMBt+5ECMit 1+uit
(5)
The rst di¤erence of Yit is indirectly included in this equation as productiv-
ity growth. Equation (5) is estimated using the 2SLS random e¤ects IV regression
method.25 Population growth is dropped from the specication since this variable is
found to be statistically insignicant in the preliminary analysis.26
Table 4 summarizes the results from the estimation of equation (5) for the full
and post-1994 sample periods. This table also lists instrumental variables used in this
analysis. For the full sample analysis, the results from the 2SLS random e¤ects IV
method are generally consistent with those reported in Table 2. Money, credits and
RMB are signicantly and positively related with ination. Improved productivity
seems to have relaxed the inationary pressure. Finally, the ECM enters the ination
equation negatively and signicantly, conrming the presence of cointegration between
price, money and output.
Next, given the dynamic nature of the Chinese economy, we check the sensitivity of
our results to the sample period. There are a number of factors which could possibly
bring about structural shifts in the Chinese economy since the Chinese government
has implemented a number of economic policies. Such an example is shown in Figure
2 where the RMB has become very stable against the US dollar since 1994 due to the
Chinese exchange rate policy. In this connection, we ask whether the exchange rate
regime may have inuenced our results.
The result from the 2SLS random e¤ects IV regression method is summarized in
Table 4 (post-1994) which again lists instrumental variables used in this analysis. This
table shows outcomes which are di¤erent between sample periods. First, while money
was a signicant indicator in the full-sample analysis, it no longer becomes statistically
signicant in the post-1994 period. This result can be expected from developments and
changes in the nancial markets,27 and implies that the Chinese economy is relying
24Using the data of nine Asian countries, Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye (2006) analyzed the re-
lationship between ination and productivity growth and reported evidence of no unique causal
relationship for most (eight out of nine) countries.
25See Baltagi (2008) about this estimation method.
26Equation (5) is not inconsistent with the long-run formation (2) in the sense that the rst dif-
ferences of log price, money and output (income) are included in equation (5) although output is
transferred to productivity (GDP divided by labor).
27We note that further investigation is needed to reach a rm conclusion that nancial innovation (or
sophistication) is a cause of breakdown in the ination-money relationship. Fischer (2007) examines
instability of the money demand function in Switzerland and found that nancial sophistication is
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more heavily on non-cash transactions. This also serves as a warning to the PBC in its
heavy reliance on money as an intermediate target when conducting monetary policy.
Similarly, it should be noted that the signicance level of credits has dropped in this
period from the one to ve percent level.
Secondly, more consistent evidence for productivity is reported in the post-1994
period. It is now signicantly negative in the ination equation with narrow money
as well, which was insignicant in the full sample analysis. This result may have been
brought about by the adoption of a more market-oriented economic policy, e.g., the
privatization of state-owned rms, which induces more competition in the market.
Thirdly, the sensitivity of ination to the RMB has increased during this period.
Since the currency exhibited negligible uctuations compared with the pre-1994 period,
our result should be interpreted as signifying that very small changes in the RMB
were associated with a moderate rate of ination. This result may also underline
the increased importance of international trade in China and the economys increased
sensitivity to exchange rate changes.28
In short, we nd evidence that economic fundamentals, notably money, are very
sensitive to the sample period, but that credits, productivity and exchange rate growth
remain signicant driving forces of ination movements in China regardless of the
sample period.
We also analyze the sensitivity of our results to the choice of provinces in the
presence of the heterogeneous economic development among regions. Generally it is
believed that in the past Chinese economic policy was successful in development of
the coastal (eastern) provinces, while the middle and western provinces have lagged
behind the east and have benetted less from the recent economic growth in China.
Therefore, we divide the sample into fast- and slow-growing provinces in terms of real
GDP growth (as shown in Table 1).
Due to data availability, our study is limited to a full sample analysis, and the re-
sults are reported in Table 5 where instrumental variables used in this analysis are also
shown. Generally, our results are very similar to those from the full-sample analysis
reported in Table 4 and thus are robust to the choice of region; Chinese ination can
be explained by economic fundamentals. Credits and exchange rates, the monetary
authoritiesinstruments, are signicantly and positively related with ination. So is
money which has been used in the past as an intermediate target. Also we note that,
consistent with the long-run analysis, the ECM enters the ination equation with a
negative sign, which again conrms cointegration between price, money and output.
not the cause.
28This is particularly so since 2004. The trade balance-to-GDP ratio soared from around 2 percent
in 2003/04 to 5 percent in 2005. Furthermore, demand and price elasticities have risen signicantly
in recent years (Azia and Li, 2007).
12
4 Conclusion
Using advanced econometric methods, this paper has analyzed Chinese ination using
a panel of regional data from 1991 to 2005. Use of regional data is in sharp contrast
to previous studies that employed country-level price/ination data and allows us to
conduct sensitivity analysis using the sub-samples of our data set. Since excess Chinese
ination has adverse e¤ects on both the domestic and international economies, we
believe that it is important to understand the evolution of Chinese ination.
Based on a reduced form equation, our results show that recent Chinese ination
(price) can be explained by some economic fundamentals although it is still in tran-
sition to the market-oriented economy. As in industrial countries, there is evidence
of a long-run relationship between price, money, and output and of a signicant rela-
tionship between ination and growth in money, credits, productivity, and exchange
rates, with the signs of their parameters consistent with economic theory. Since in
the past Chinese monetary authorities have closely monitored growth in money as
an intermediate target and used credits and the exchange rate as instruments, we
conclude that Chinese monetary policy was inuential over ination although it was
not its sole objective during our sample period. In addition, it should be noted that
none of these results are sensitive to the choice of region; the data from high- and
low-growing provinces show very similar results. However, this result should be inter-
preted with caution since the relationship between money growth and ination seems
to have weakened over recent years.
Finally, this study could be extended in a number of ways. First, one could consider
di¤erent dates for structural breaks. We determined the date of the structural break
based on the exchange rate which exhibited very clear signs of a break. However,
since the Chinese economy is in transition to a market-oriented market, it may be
more appropriate to allow more possibilities for break dates. Secondly, other scale
variables such as output gap, and expected and lagged ination could be incorporated
to further develop this study. We acknowledge that there are severe constraints on
data availability as of this writing.
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Tables
Table 1. Economic Growth
High-Growth Region Low-Growth Region
Beijing Liaoning
Tianjin Jilin
Hebei Heilongjiang
Shanxi Jiangxi
Inner Mongolia Guangxi
Shanghai Hainan
Jiangsu Sichuan
Zhejiang Guizhou
Anhui Yunnan
Fujian Shaanxi
Shandong Gansu
Henan Qinghai
Guangdong Ningxia
Xinjiang
Note: Based on real GDP growth rates.
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Table 3. The Long-Run Relationship
[1] [2]
M2t 0.548 [0.007] ** 
M1t  0.610 [0.008] **
Yit -0.153 [0.020] ** -0.153 [0.021] **
Panel ADF cointegration test (Pedroni) -5.952 ** -6.974 **
Panel cointegration test (Kao) -10.97 ** -11.279 **
Panel cointegration test (Westerlund) -10.398 ** -8.241 +
Note: These estimates are obtained from the OLS. Price is regressed against money
(M2 or M1) and real income (Y ). The panel cointegration tests are based on Pedroni
(1999), Kao (1999) and Westerlund (2007), and examine the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. The Schwarz Information Criterion is used to decide the lag order.
The p-value for the Westerlund test is obtained by the bootstrap method. The sta-
tistics signicant at the one, ve and ten percent levels are indicated by **, *, and +
respectively. The sample period is from 1991 to 2005.
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Figures 
Figure 1. Country-Level GDP Growth And Inflation 
 
Data source: The WEO database of the IMF. The GDP growth rate (based on national currency) is the author’s calculation. The CPI 
is Chinese inflation based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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Figure 2. Chinese Exchange Rate vis-à-vis US Dollar. 
 
Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics  
 
Figure 3. Chinese Retail Price and Consumer Price Indices 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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